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SECURITIES LAW-THE EROSION OF SECURITIES CLASS
ACTIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
"Start with arrogance. Add greed, deceit, and financial chicanery. What
do you get? A company that wasn't what it was cracked up to be."' Enron,
AOL, Charles Ponzi, and Bernard Madoff have become household names
because they, along with many others, belong to some of the most egregious
United States securities law violators.2 Since the 1920s, securities violations
have resulted in the loss of many billions of American dollars.3 A security
represents a right in something else, such as stock with an accompanying
right in a corporation or an investment contract with an accompanying right
n a profit-seeking undertaking.4 Money lost from securities investments
includes loss from market forces and loss from mismanagement of corporate
funds,5 but a significant portion of money lost is attributable to fraudulent
activities involving securities.6 Fraudulent activities include misstatements
1. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., No. H-01-3624 (consolidated
complaint for violation of the securities laws), I (S.D. Tex. April 8, 2002) (quoting Fortune
Magazine).
2. Other well-known violators of the U.S. securities laws include WorldCom, Inc.,
Bank of America, Philip Morris, and the KPMG accounting firm. See Sherrie Raiken Savett,
Securities Class Actions Since the 1995 Reform Act: A Plaintiff's Perspective, ALI-ABA 510,
535-37 (May 4-5, 2006), http://files.ali-
aba.org/thumbs/datastorage/skoobesruoc/pdf/CLO85_chapter 11 thumb.pdf; Top Ten Settle-
ments Post-Reform Act Securities Class Action Settlements, STANFORD SECURITIES CLASS
ACTION CLEARINGHOUSE, http://securities.stanford.edu/top_tenlist.html (last visited Mar. 28,
2012).
3. See ELLEN M. RYAN & LAURA E. SIMMONS, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION
SETTLEMENTS: 2009 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 4-5 (2010), available at
http://securities.stanford.edu/Settlements/REVIEW_1995-
2009/Settlements_Through 12 2009.pdf (an empirical study of "plaintiff-style" damages in
securities actions based on settlement figures). See also The Investor's Advocate: How the
SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity and Facilitates Capital Formation,
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last modified
Oct. 24, 2012) [hereinafter The Investor's Advocate] (briefly discussing "the SEC's history,
responsibilities, activities, organization, and operation" as well as briefly describing a few
securities laws).
4. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, SECURITIES REGULATION IN A NUTSHELL 27-39 (10th ed. 2009);
MARC 1. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION 39-46 (1986).
5. William A. Niskanen, A Crises of Trust, in AFTER ENRON: LESSONS FOR PUBLIC
POLICY 2-9 (William A. Niskanen ed., 2005).
6. 1 HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITES LAW HANDBOOK 23-29 (2009-2010).
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in a company's prospectus, questionable or false financial reporting, and
abnormal accounting practices.7
Beginning in 1911, with the goal of providing protection to securities
investors, states enacted blue sky laws. 8 Blue sky laws are conduct-
regulating statutes that seek to protect investors from potential security
fraud.9 In an attempt to achieve uniform regulation in the field of securities,
Congress enacted various pieces of legislation between 1933 and 2002.10 As
distinguished from blue sky laws, the federal securities laws are notice stat-
utes designed to assist investors in making informed decisions related to the
purchase and sale of securities." The federal securities laws include multi-
ple fraud provisions and a private right of action, which serve as a remedy to
defrauded investors. 12 Private securities actions serve as a necessary sup-
plement to the United States Securities and Exchange Commission's 3
(SEC) enforcement activities and deter securities law violations. 4 Without
this private right of action, millions of stockholders and employees with
pension and 401k plans would be vulnerable to securities law violators, and
they would be at risk of permanently losing their investments without any
mechanism for redress.
While the private right of action is "the primary vehicle for compensat-
ing defrauded investors,"' 5 it is usually cost prohibitive for a single inves-
tor. 6 As a result, one of the most effective ways to address securities fraud
is through a securities class action.' 7 Securities class actions are recognized
7. Savett, supra note 2, at 504.
8. STEINBERG, supra note 4, at 5. See also 1-2 BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 6, at 28,
681-84. Many state securities laws, known as "blue sky" laws, contain anti-fraud provisions,
which include private rights of action. See id. at 694. These laws parallel the various legisla-
tive provisions enacted by Congress. See also 50 STATE STATUTORY SURVEYS: BLUE SKY
LAWS: SECURITIES VIOLATIONS 12 (2011).
9. STEINBERG, supra note 4, at 5.
10. In re Enron Corp. Sec., 535 F.3d 325, 337 (5th Cir. 2008).
11. STEINBERG, supra note 4, at 6-7.
12. See John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform: The Long and Winding Road to
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 Bus. LAw. 335, 337 (1996).
13. The SEC is the agency charged with the principal responsibility of enforcing and
administering federal securities laws. The Investor's Advocate, supra note 3.
14. Avery, supra note 12, at 335.
15. Id.
16. The costs of an individual lawsuit include attorney fees, discovery, and the require-
ments under "security for expense statutes" to post monies to be paid to defense counsel if
the court finds the plaintiff's lawsuit to be frivolous. James Cotton, Another Nail in the Coffin
of the Small Investor: The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 17 TOURO L.
REV. 733, 734, 748-51 (2001).
17. Avery, supra note 12, at 371 ("Class action lawsuits generally further judicial effi-
ciency and make it feasible for a broad group of investors who have relatively small individ-
ual claims to maintain an action for damages."); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The
Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues,
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by Congress as an "indispensable tool" to provide investors with financial
recovery for their losses. 8 In the past fifteen years, Congress has enacted
three pieces of legislation that have a significant impact on securities class
actions: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 23; "9 the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA);2 ' and the Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA) 2' (collectively, the "securities
legislation"). These three pieces of legislation were designed to improve
federal class action litigation,2 2 in part, to provide more effective representa-
tion for investors, decrease frivolous lawsuits, and provide increased recov-
ery for plaintiffs.23
This note examines interrelated provisions of the securities legislation
and the resulting impact on the effectiveness of class actions as a remedy for
settling disputes. Part II of the note will discuss securities class actions as
well as the background, history, and intended goal of each relevant legisla-
tive provision. Part III will discuss the securities legislation's impact on the
availability of securities class actions, the parties to those class actions, and
the discord between the goal of the legislation and the practical application
as related to settlement opt-out claims. Part IV will discuss existing mecha-
nisms that may serve as viable solutions to this emerging problem and will
propose a new solution to the problem. Finally, Part V briefly concludes by
summarizing the information and findings of this note.
57 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1530 (2004) ("Class actions are a useful means for achieving econ-
omies of scale in litigation, facilitating the prosecution of claims that would be uneconomic
to litigate individually, and strengthening enforcement of the laws.").
18. Lisa L. Casey, Class Action Criminality, 34 J. CORP. L. 153, 162-63 (2008).
19. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
20. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771, 77t, 77z-1, 77z-2, 78a, 78j-1, 78t, 78o, 78u,
78u-4, 78u-5 and 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2006)).
21. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat.
3227 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77, 77aa, 77aaa, 77b, 77ccc, 77ddd, 77k, 77m,
77mmm, 77p, 77r, 77sss, 77v, 77z-1, 77z-2, 77z-3, 78, 78bb, 78c, 78d, 78ee, 78g, 78kk, 7811,
78n, 78o, 78o-4, 78o-5, 78q, 78s, 78t, 78u-4, 78z, 80a, 80a-1, 80a-18, 80a-2, 80a-29, 80a-3,
80a-30, 80b, 80b-18a and 80b-3 (2006)).
22. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 74, 82-83, 88
(2006).
23. Avery, supra note 12, at 336, 348; Adam C. Pritchard, Should Congress Repeal
Securities Class Action Reform?, in AFTER ENRON: LESSONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 130-31




A. Securities Class Actions
The life of a class action begins at certification and usually ends at
dismissal or settlement.24 Securities actions are the largest category of class
actions, and they usually take the form of a class action because this device
makes the pursuit of small individual recoveries economical.25 The most
common securities class action is based on fraud.2 6 There are at least nine
fraud-related provisions27 in the securities law statutory scheme, and several
of these provisions provide an express or implied right of action, which is
necessary to initiate litigation." Furthermore, in securities fraud class ac-
tions, the plaintiff sues the corporation and its officers for misrepresenta-
tions regarding the company's financial performance.29
The steps toward trial and resolution in a securities class action are
similar to the procedures in any other lawsuit (motions, pre-trial hearings,
discovery, etc.), but they are conducted and regulated differently in a securi-
ties class action, and the securities legislation now substantially impacts
these procedures. The securities legislation created several procedural hur-
dles that a plaintiff must overcome to defeat summary judgment and move
past the initial stage of filing a complaint.30 If a plaintiff can successfully
overcome these procedural hurdles, the securities class action proceeds
much like any other lawsuit, with the majority of claims being resolved
through settlement.31 Settlement, however, is another area significantly
complicated by the securities legislation.32
24. Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, The Unjustified Judicial Creation of
Class Certification Merits Trials in Securities Fraud Actions, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 323,
324 (2010); Melissa Col6n-Bosolet, The Elusive Nine: Securities Class-Action Trials Since
1995, A.B.A. COM. & Bus. LITIG., Summer 2010, at 1, 14-17 (only nine securities class
actions have been resolved by trial in the past fifteen years).
25. Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 24, at 324.
26. See Savett, supra note 2, at 508. See generally BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 6, at 26-
33 (discussing general fraud provisions and introducing actions for fraud in the sale of securi-
ties).
27. Frequently cited fraud-related provisions of the Securities Act include: Section l0b
and Rule lOb-5, Section 11, Section 12(a), Section 17, Section 18, and Section 20(a).
BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 6, at 25-31.
28. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 6, at 25-31.
29. Pritchard, supra note 23 at 126-30.
30. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771, 77p, 77v, 77z-1, 77z-2, 78a, 78j-1, 78t, 78u, 78u-4, 78u-
5, 78bb (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 196 (2006); FED. R. Civ. P. 23; Kaufnan & Wunderlich, supra
note 24, at 324-29.
31. See Savett, supra note 2, at 509; CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS
ACTION FILINGS 2009: A YEAR IN REVIEW, 21-22 (2010), available at
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B. Legislation
While the securities legislation was designed to permit the fair resolu-
tion of legitimate claims, it does not operate fairly for all parties.33 In fact,
the legislative intent and the actual effect of the securities legislation are
vastly different. Although aspects of the securities legislation offer many
positive results to class action plaintiffs, such as increased settlement
amounts34 and decreased attorney fees,35 upon closer examination one can
see that the securities legislation produces a significant negative impact
overall. Some of the problems caused by the securities legislation include
procedural hurdles that operate in favor of defendants, increased participa-
tion in and influence upon class actions by institutional investors, and in-
creased dismissal rates for class actions.36
Each piece of the securities legislation has a different purpose and goal.
FRCP 23 applies to all class actions brought in federal court.37 PLSRA is
applicable to all private actions involving securities that must be registered
under the Securities Act of 1933 and securities that are traded under the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934.38 SLUSA is applicable to class actions with
more than fifty plaintiffs whose lawsuit involves securities covered under
the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 39 Taken
together, the securities legislation applies to a group of fifty or more plain-
tiffs bringing litigation in federal court to exercise a private right of action
regarding a registered or traded security under the Securities Act of 1933 or
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouse-research/2009-YIR/Cornerstone-Research-Fiin
gs_2009_YIR.pdf.
32. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771, 77p, 77v, 77z-1, 77z-2, 78a, 78j-1, 78t, 78u, 78u-4, 78u-
5, 78bb; 18 U.S.C. § 196; FED. R. Civ. P. 23; Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 24, at 344-
49.
33. Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 24, at 330. See also Avery, supra note 12, at
335 (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739 (1975)); Cotton,
supra note 16, at 733-39 (discussing the hurdles small investors face "in obtaining infor-
mation relating to potential fraud and misrepresentation by corporate management").
34. Savett, supra note 2, at 508-09. See also RYAN & SIMMONS, supra note 3, at 1-5.
35. Pritchard, supra note 23, at 131-32.
36. Savett, supra note 2, at 503-14.
37. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
38. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1, 77u-4. The Securities Act of 1933 was enacted after the stock
market crash of 1929. STEINBERG, supra note 4, at 6. The Act requires that any offer or sale
of securities using the means and instrumentalities of interstate commerce be registered pur-
suant to the 1933 Act unless an exemption from registration exists under the law. Id. at 16-
18. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 governs the trading of securities after their initial
public offering and regulates the U.S. financial markets and those who trade on them. Id. at
18-21. This Act also established the Securities and Exchange Commission. Id. at 6.
39. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p, 78bb.
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1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (FRCP 23)
The preliminary stage of every class action is class certification.40 This
means the securities class action plaintiff must plead and demonstrate satis-
faction of the requirements of FRCP 23(a) and (b) in the initial complaint
before the lawsuit can proceed.4 ' FRCP 23(a) requires plaintiffs to demon-
strate the prerequisites of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequa-
cy of representation.42 FRCP 23(b) requires plaintiffs to demonstrate that
their action fits into one of three categories that will afford them relief:
[FRCP] 23(b)(1) class actions are maintainable if either (1) the de-
fendant is at risk of inconsistent adjudication or (2) the class
members are fighting over a limited fund. [FRCP] 23(b)(2) class
actions are maintainable if the class seeks solely injunctive relief.
Last, [FRCP] 23(b)(3) class actions are maintainable if questions
of law and fact common to the members of the class predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members.
4 3
Since the majority of securities class actions result in settlement, the
grant of class certification is a vital step toward monetary recovery. 44 Be-
cause most securities class actions seek monetary damages, rather than in-
junctive relief or payment from a limited fund, plaintiffs most often seek
certification under FRCP 23(b)(3), and they must overcome the demanding
requirement of predominance. 45 Predominance "requires [the] court to con-
sider 'how a trial on the merits would be conducted if a class were certi-
fied,"' so that the class does not degenerate into a series of individual tri-
als.46
The court's role in the certification process is the first of many proce-
dural hurdles erected by the securities legislation. The court's consideration
of class certification requires "identifying the substantive issues that will
control the outcome, assessing which issues will predominate, and then de-
40. FED. R. Civ. P. 23. See also Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 24, at 323-24.
41. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
42. FED. R. Cw. P. 23(a). For a detailed discussion of these prerequisites, see generally
John C. Coffee, Jr. & Stefan Paulovic, Class Certification: Developments Over the Last Five
Years 2002-2007 The Future of Class Actions, 8 CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. (BNA) S-787
(2007).
43. Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 24, at 325. See also In re Global Crossing See.
& ERISA Litig., 225 F.R.D. 436, 453-55 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
44. Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 24, at 323. See also Col6n-Bosolet, supra note
24, at 1, 14-17 (noting that most securities actions end in settlement and discussing the nine
class-action trials since 1995).
45. See Coffee & Paulovic, supra note 42, at 196, 216.
46. Gene & Gene, LLC v. BioPay, LLC, 541 F.3d 318, 326 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell
Atl. Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 339 F.3d 294, 302 (5th Cir. 2003)).
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termining whether the issues are common to the class."47 Unfortunately,
federal courts have turned the class certification process into a mini trial,
requiring plaintiffs to prove or proffer elements of their securities fraud
case, thereby jeopardizing valid fraud claims and plaintiff recovery. FRCP
23 makes the court the sole arbiter in determining whether the proposed
class is "sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation. 49
In the statutory scheme of securities class actions, once a plaintiff over-
comes the hurdles of FRCP 23, the class must also address PSLRA, which
among other things requires a heightened pleading standard that must be
taken into account when seeking class'certification.5°
2. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA)
PSLRA is a comprehensive "revision of both substantive and proce-
dural law governing private [class] actions under the federal securities
laws."5 PSLRA was designed to reduce the number of frivolous securities
class actions filed in federal court and to stop coercive settlement practic-
es.52 PSLRA, however, significantly alters the treatment of meritorious
claims.53 Provisions that alter the treatment of meritorious claims and erect
several hurdles a plaintiff must overcome include a heightened pleading
standard, lead plaintiff requirements, an automatic stay of discovery pending
the resolution of dismissal motions, a safe harbor for forward-looking state-
ments,54 a system of proportionate liability for certain defendants,55 and
mandatory sanctions for violations of FRCP 11 (b).
56
One of the most daunting provisions of PSLRA is the heightened
pleading requirement applicable to securities fraud actions brought under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.57 This heightened standard requires the
plaintiff to plead facts as to each alleged fraudulent statement or omission
47. Id.
48. Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 24, at 323. See generally Alaska Elec. Pension
Fund v. Flowserve Corp., 572 F.3d 221, 233-34 (5th Cir. 2009).
49. Gene & Gene, 541 F.3d at 326 (citing Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S.
591,623-24(1997)).
50. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 77z-1, 78u-4 (2006); Avery, supra note 12, at 357.
51. Avery, supra note 12, at 335.
52. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771, 77z-1, 77z-2, 78a, 78j-1, 78t, 78u, 78u-4, 78u-
5 and 18 U.S.C. § 1964); Avery, supra note 12, at 353-54.
53. See Avery, supra note 12, at 354.
54. A forward-looking statement is one that is issued by the corporation and makes a
projection about the company's financial future. Id. at 344.
55. Defendants that have not knowingly committed a violation of the securities law are
given preferential treatment and are exempt from joint and several liability. Id. at 361-63.
56. Id. at 336-37.
57. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b).
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and to plead with particularity facts that demonstrate the defendant had the
requisite wrongful state of mind with regard to the fraudulent statement or
omission. 58 "[A]n inference of scienter [or wrongful state of mind] must be
more than merely plausible or reasonable-it must be cogent and at least as
compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent. ' 9 One can
imagine that heightened pleading is challenging during the early stages of
litigation and even more challenging at the class certification stage.6" Before
a securities fraud class is certified or any discovery has taken place, the
court "must engage in a comparative evaluation ... [and] consider, not only
inferences urged by the plaintiffs ... but also competing inferences rational-
ly drawn from the facts alleged.",6' The heightened pleading requirement ties
plaintiffs' hands in private actions, requiring them to produce evidence they
do not have and cannot obtain without the benefit of discovery.62
Equally significant changes, and another procedural hurdle created by
PSLRA, are the requirements for identifying the lead plaintiff and the man-
date that the court choose the lead plaintiff that will represent the class.63
Under PSLRA, the plaintiff named in the initial complaint is no longer the
lead plaintiff; rather, the court must select from the class members the per-
son(s) or entity that the court determines is most capable of adequately rep-
resenting the interests of the class members. 64 This statutory mandate comes
with a presumption, rebuttable in only two instances,65 that the lead plaintiff
should have the largest financial interest in the case. 66 PSLRA also pro-
scribes the steps required to identify the lead plaintiff. The initial plaintiff is
required to publish notice and advise class members of their opportunity to
serve as lead plaintiff.67 Any class member may come forward and request
58. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-4(b)(l)-(2).
59. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 314 (2007).
60. See Lapin v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 254 F.R.D. 168, 180-181 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
61. Tellabs, Inc., 551 U.S. at 314. See also Elam v. Neidorff, 544 F.3d 921, 926-27 (8th
Cir. 2008).
62. See generally Elam, 544 F.3d at 926-30 (holding that the plaintiffs' allegations of
inflated stock prices where the defendants had access to information that conflicted with
company statements did not give rise to a strong inference of scienter).
63. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-I(a)(2)-(3), 78u-4(a)(2)-(3); Avery, supra note 12, at 373-75.
64. Savett, supra note 2, at 513.
65. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-l(a)(3)(iii)(II), 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(II) ("The presumption ... may
be rebutted only upon proof by a member of the purported plaintiff class that the presump-
tively most adequate plaintiffi ] (aa) will not fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class; or (bb) is subject to unique defenses that render such plaintiff incapable of adequately
representing the class.").
66. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-l(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb), 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb). See also Avery,
supra note 12, at 336-37.
67. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(a)(3)(A)(i)(II), 78u-4(a)(3)(A)(i)(IJ). See also Savett, supra note
2, at 513.
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to be considered as lead plaintiff.6" Serving as lead plaintiff is significant
because, as the class representative, the lead plaintiff makes binding deci-
sions regarding how the action goes forward, including decisions such as the
selection of class counsel.69
Plaintiffs' attorneys fuel and control class actions.70 During the last
decade, as many as half of all settled securities class actions were litigated
by the law firms of Milberg, Weis, Bershad, Hynes & Lerach and Coughlin,
Stoia, Geller, Rudman & Robbins.7 Class action plaintiffs' attorneys do not
wait for clients to come to them, but, instead, they often seek out potential
class members.72 These attorneys investigate the potentially fraudulent vio-
lations of securities law and devote significant resources to building a case,
all in pursuit of attorney fees.73 With the enactment of PSLRA, recovery of
historically high attorneys' fees declined.74 The decline in revenue for attor-
neys, coupled with the increased regulation of federal court class actions as
compared to state court actions,75 led many securities class action attorneys
to control their litigation by filing actions in more plaintiff-friendly and less
regulated state courts.76 Plaintiffs' attorneys began using blue sky laws,77
which exist in almost every state, to circumvent FRCP 23 and PSLRA. In
response to such attempts to circumvent the federal legislation, Congress
enacted SLUSA.78
68. Savett, supra note 2, at 514.
69. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-l(a)(3)(B)(v), 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v).
70. See Pritchard, supra note 23, at 131.
71. RYAN & SIMMONS, supra note 3, at 14; Mukesh Bajaj, Sumon C. Mazumdar &
Atulya Sain, Securities Class Action Settlements: An Empirical Analysis, 43 SANTA CLARA
L. REv. 1001, 1030-31 (2003); CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 31, at 28. Milberg Weis
and Coughlin Stoia are plaintiffs' law firms based in New York, New York.
72. Casey, supra note 18, at 156-58 (2008).
73. Id. at 157-58.
74. Pritchard, supra note 23, at 131-32 (discussing attorneys' fees pre-PSLRA and the
practical effect of the PSLRA regulations). See also 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(a)(6)-(a)(7)(C) (re-
stricting attorneys' fees).
75. See Edward F. Sherman, Class Action Fairness Act and the Federalization of Class
Actions, 238 F.R.D. 504, 505-06 (2007). See generally Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994) (discussing the private right of action
under federal law as compared to state law).
76. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 82 (2006).
77. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
78. Securities Litigation Reform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat.
3227 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p, 77v, 77z-1, 78u-4, 78bb (2006)); John G.
Despriet & Shayne R. Clinton, Evolution of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act,
33 SEC. REG. L.J. 268, 268-69 (2005).
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3. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA)
SLUSA was enacted after PSLRA to ensure that PSLRA fully achieved
its objectives.7 9 SLUSA is targeted directly at securities fraud class actions,
and it prevents a private party from bringing a class action alleging "an un-
true statement or omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase
or sale of a covered security or [alleging] that the defendant used or em-
ployed any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in connection
with the purchase or sale of a covered security."8
Congress wanted to curb litigation that circumvented PSLRA's federal
court requirement and distorted the efficient operation of the national securi-
ties market.81 The basic thrust of SLUSA is to require that all "covered class
actions"82 based on state laws be removed to federal district court.83 A "cov-
ered class action" is a lawsuit in which
(I) damages are sought on behalf of more than [fifty] persons or prospec-
tive class members, and questions of law or fact common to those per-
sons or members of the prospective class, without reference to issues of
individualized reliance on an alleged misstatement or omission, predom-
inate over any questions affecting only individual persons or members;
or
(II) one or more named parties seek to recover damages on a representa-
tive basis on behalf of themselves and other unnamed parties similarly
situated, and questions of law or fact common to those persons or mem-
bers of the prospective class predominate over any questions affecting
only individual persons or members; or
(ii) any group of lawsuits filed in or pending in the same court and in-
volving common questions of law or fact, in which-
(I) damages are sought on behalf of more than [fifty] persons; and
79. Securities Litigation Reform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat.
3227 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p, 77v, 77z-1, 78u-4, 78bb).
80. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(b)-(c) (emphasis added). "The term 'covered security' means a
security that satisfies the standards for a covered security specified in paragraph (1) or (2) of
section 18(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 [15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)], at the time during which it is
alleged that the misrepresentation, omission, or manipulative or deceptive conduct occurred.
... 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(5)(E). "Section 18(b) of the 1933 Act in turn defines covered secu-
rity to include securities listed on a national exchange." 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b). See also Merrill
Lynch, 547 U.S. at 84 ("covered security" includes one that is "traded nationally and listed on
a regulated national exchange").
81. Despriet & Clinton, supra note 78, at 268. See also In re Enron Corp. Sec., 535 F.3d
325, 337-38 (5th Cir. 2008).
82. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(5)(B).
83. Securities Litigation Reform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat.
3227 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p, 77v, 77z-1, 78u-4, 78bb).
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(II) the lawsuits are joined, consolidated, or otherwise proceed as a sin-
gle action for any purpose.
84
SLUSA was designed to close a loophole in PSLRA that allowed plain-
tiffs to litigate securities fraud class actions under state law and bypass the
PSLRA requirements. 85
SLUSA preempts a securities class action if four conditions are satisfied:
(1) the action is a "covered class action;" (2) the claims are based on
state law; (3) the action involves one or more "covered securities;" and
(4) the claims allege a misrepresentation or omission of material fact "in
connection with the purchase or sale" of the security.
86
SLUSA functions as both a preemption and removal statute. 7 Once the
defendant removes the action from state to federal court, the court must de-
termine if SLUSA preempts state law claims, and if it does, the court must
dismiss the claims.88 Courts interpret SLUSA broadly to ensure the effec-
tiveness of its stated purpose,89 but one detrimental effect of SLUSA is that
certain claims are barred from litigation in both federal and state court, leav-
ing many individual plaintiffs without a remedy.9"
C. Settlement
Once a class is certified and a lead plaintiff is chosen, the issue of
money can be addressed. In a class action, monetary recovery can be ac-
complished by final judgment or settlement, with settlement occurring most
often.91 Another lead-plaintiff decision involves settlement.9 2 Legislators
and courts view settlements favorably, and this is especially true in class
actions because settlement encourages compromise and the conservation of
judicial resources.93
Without settlement agreements, some plaintiffs would be completely
without recovery, yet the securities legislation erects hurdles in this stage of
84. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(5)(B). See also Merrill Lynch, 547 U.S. at 84 n.8.
85. In re Enron Corp. Sec., 535 F.3d at 338.
86. Id. at 338-39.
87. Id. at 341.
88. Despriet & Clinton, supra note 78, at 273.
89. See Merrill Lynch, 547 U.S. at 86.
90. Securities Litigation Reform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat.
3227 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p, 77v, 77z-1, 78u-4, 78bb); Merrill Lynch, 547
U.S. at 74 (SLUSA preempts state law class actions that have no remedy under federal law).
91. Col6n-Bosolet, supra note 24, at 1.
92. See generally Newby v. Enron Corp., 394 F.3d 296, 300 (5th Cir. 2004) (where
representative plaintiffs agreed to a partial settlement and several groups intervened to object
to the partial settlement).
93. See In re Global Crossing & ERISA Litig., 225 F.R.D. 436, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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the litigation as well.94 PSLRA requires a detailed disclosure of proposed,
partial, or final settlements to all class members,95 while at the same time
FRCP 23 requires a showing of procedural fairness and desirable results.
96
An approvable settlement must be "fair, adequate, and reasonable and not
the product of collusion between the parties."97 Because of the importance
of settlements to plaintiffs' recovery, 98 recent court decisions have even
approved partial settlements.99 Once a class action settlement is approved, it
can only be set aside for an abuse of discretion. 100
D. Objectors and Opt-Outs
Plaintiffs who are unhappy with settlement terms have two options-
formally object or opt out of the settlement. 101 The ability to object or self-
exclude, provided by FRCP 23(c) and allowed in FRCP 23(b)(3) cases,"0 2
has become a fundamental aspect of class action litigation. 0 3 Opt-out rights
are considered a favorable means of protecting plaintiffs, particularly absent
ones, from abuses in litigation."° Unfortunately, the possibility of mass
numbers of plaintiffs exercising opt-out rights can threaten a negotiated
class settlement." 5 When too many plaintiffs opt out, the judge has to de-
termine how to proceed with the litigation. Options include using judicial
discretion to either approve or deny the settlement agreement as to all re-
maining plaintiffs in the class or to decertify the class. 106 In cases where the
settlement is denied or the class is decertified, litigation is affected, causing
additional delays in recovery for class plaintiffs who must choose between
dismissing the class action, litigating to the conclusion of the class action,
or, if the class is decertified, litigating multiple individual or small group
lawsuits in state court. 
107
Taken together, the securities legislation funnels securities class action
lawsuits into federal district courts and requires that litigation proceed based
94. Newby, 394 F.3d at 301-02.
95. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-l(a)(7), 78u-4(a)(7).
96. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e); In re Global Crossing, 225 F.R.D. at 455.
97. Newby, 394 F.3d at 301.
98. Id. at 302; In re Global Crossing, 225 F.R.D. at 455-56.
99. Newby, 394 F.3d at 298-99; Avery, supra note 12, at 365.
100. Newby, 394 F.3d at 300.
101. See, e.g., id. at 296; Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 17, at 1531.
102. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(a).
103. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 17, at 1531.
104. Id. at 1534-35.
105. Id. at 1537.
106. FED. R. Crv. P. 23.
107. In re Global Crossing Sec. & ERISA Litig., 225 F.R.D. 436, 455-457 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (discussing judicial approval of class action settlements).
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upon federal securities laws. The securities legislation also regulates the
content of the pleadings and creates substantial hurdles for class action certi-
fication and ensuing litigation. The requirements and regulations contained
in the securities legislation essentially curtail the plaintiffs' legal remedies
by significantly regulating and limiting the litigation of meritorious claims.
III. THE EROSION OF THE SECURITIES CLASS ACTION DEVICE
A. Impact of Securities Legislation
Class action reform "was a victory for accountants, securities firms,
and the high-technology industry," but it was a blow to the plaintiffs' bar." 8
The reform is considered a victory because of the numerous protections af-
forded to business and financial industries, but the numerous hurdles erected
complicate the initiation and pursuit of a securities class action for plaintiffs.
Protections for defendants, such as the rule for proportionate liability and
forward-looking statements, and hurdles, such as automatic stays of discov-
ery and heightened pleading standards, operate against plaintiffs. Now, "[t]o
be successful, a securities class-action plaintiff must thread the eye of a nee-
dle made smaller and smaller over the years by judicial decree and congres-
sional action. [These] ever higher hurdles are not, however, intended to pre-
vent viable securities actions from being brought."'0 9 However intended, the
years of judicial decree and congressional action have created conditions
that facilitated scandals like Enron and Worldcom and fraud by CEOs such
as Bernie Madoff.
The securities legislation's procedural formalities and substantive pro-
visions, with which the plaintiff must comply, coupled with protections af-
forded to the defendant, create a shield for the defendant, allowing for vary-
ing levels of deception, lying, and unaccountability. The plaintiffs' bar ar-
gues that the restrictions on class actions gives "corporations carte blanche
to engage in fraud." ' For example, a defendant that issues a prospectus
with exceptional statements regarding financial projections is protected from
litigation so long as the statements are denoted as forward-looking. Mean-
while, because of their reduced ability to bring successful litigation, the in-
dividual investor has become the victim of unintended consequences, and
108. Pritchard, supra note 23, at 125-26.
109. Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Flowserve Corp., 572 F.3d 221,235 (5th Cir. 2009).
110. Pritchard, supra note 23, at 126.
111. Cotton, supra note 16, at 739.
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institutional investors are emerging as goliaths of the plaintiff securities
class action.'
Increased participation from institutional investors in securities class
actions can cause a problem or provide a solution. Institutional investors are
likely to be chosen as the lead plaintiff because they are viewed by the
courts as having the necessary size and financial resources necessary to meet
PSLRA's mandate."' As a strong lead plaintiff, an institutional investor can
successfully guide a class action and effectuate a preferential settlement for
all members. However, institutional investors also have "the economic in-
centive and financial wherewithal to pursue their own actions ... and are
opting out of class actions and proceeding on their own."' 14 Whether as a
lead plaintiff or class member, an institutional investor that opts out of a
class action weakens the action by removing multiple plaintiffs and vast
resources. 115
An emerging and fast-growing problem created by the securities legis-
lation is that of opt-outs. 116 Opt-outs occur when members of the certified
class choose to opt out of the class action and pursue settlement or continued
litigation as an individual plaintiff or small group. "7 Plaintiffs consider opt-
ing out when settlement is a disadvantage because of the small amount of
potential recovery per plaintiff. "8 The extensive lag-time between case-
filing and case resolution created by the securities legislation119 encourages
plaintiffs, especially institutional investors, to opt out of the class action in
an attempt to receive increased or quicker monetary relief. 120 By opting out,
an institutional investor also gains complete control over the prosecution of
its claims. 121 The institutional investor becomes the only plaintiff, avoiding
many of the restrictions that come from class representation. Once out of the
class action, the institutional investor has increased authority over and flexi-
bility throughout the litigation. 22 The institutional investor can now select
112. See Bailey Cavaleeri LLC, Securities Class Action Opt-Out Claims: A Growing
Problem, BAILEYCAVALEERI.COM, http://www.baileycavalieri.com/73-
Securities Opt_OutClaims.pdf (last visited May 10, 2012).
113. See supra Part II.B.2.
114. Michael Feldberg & Lanier Saperstein, Class Certification: Bigger Is Not Necessari-
ly Better, ALLEN & OVERY (Feb. 6, 2009), http://clientlink.allenovery.com/images/NYPR-
BIN/links/Class certification bigger is not necessarilybetter.pdf.
115. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 17, at 1536-40; supra Part II.D.
116. See Dan Bailey, Securities Class Action Opt-Out Claims: A Growing Problem, 2010
EMERGING ISSUES 4975 (2010).
117. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 17, at 1544.
118. Id. at 1533.
119. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 31, at 2.
120. See Bailey Cavaleeri LLC, supra note 112, at 1.
121. Id.
122. Id. ("By opting out, the institutional investor has the opportunity to actively control
the prosecution of its own claims, file the case in its own state, and, most importantly, negoti-
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legal counsel; negotiate attorneys' fees; settle the action at any time for any
amount (which increasingly is for a larger dollar amount than offered to
original class members); and use its size, stature, and time in the class action
as leverage in settlement negotiations or at trial. 
123
Further, when opting out, an institutional investor, an individual, or a
small group under fifty in number has the option to pursue litigation in state
court. 124 In a state court action, an investor may bring claims with a broader
scope of liability and allege damages against a larger number and more var-
ied type of corporate wrongdoers (including aiders and abettors), 125 while
avoiding the litigation hurdles, limitations, and delays imposed by federal
securities laws, including heightened pleading standards and the discovery
stay under PSLRA. '26
By participating as a class member and employing a wait-and-see ap-
proach, an institutional investor can either attempt to negotiate a settlement
of its claims with defendants before opting out of the class or, if negotiations
are not successful, the institutional investor may opt out before class settle-
ment and proceed with a direct action against the defendants, using all the
information gained and legal resources exerted by class counsel during its
time as a class member."2 7 The ability to participate as a class member and
opt out at a later date seemingly creates an incentive to use all available re-
sources (class participation) to gain the best possible settlement, which may
come from an individual action rather than participating as a class mem-
ber.128 Headlines throughout the past ten years have highlighted the differ-
ence between recoveries for class members and recoveries for individual
actions or opt-outs. 129 These headlines demonstrate larger recoveries for
ate a larger recovery than it would have received as a passive participant in the class ac-
tion.").
123. Id. at 2-3; Blair A. Nicholas & Ian D. Berg, Why Institutional Investors Opt-Out of
Securities Fraud Class Actions and Pursue Direct Individual Actions, PRAC. L. INST. (Oct.
15, 2009), http://www.blbglaw.com/news/publications/data/00113/
res/id=saFile l/PLIreprint7_22 09#2.pdf.
124. Bailey Cavaleeri LLC, supra note 112, at 1; Nicholas & Berg, supra note 123.
125. See, e.g., Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 191
(1994) (disallowing aider and abettor liability for 10b and 10-b5 claims, while some state
courts expressly allow for it); Nicholas & Berg, supra note 123.
126. PSLRA includes a provision that requires the stay of discovery during pendency of a
motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment. Nicholas & Berg, supra note 123.
127. See id.
128. See Fractured Class Actions: Opt-outs Are a Growing Headache for Companies,
Bus. WK. (Feb. 27, 2006), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/
06_09/b3973059.htm; Nicholas & Berg, supra note 123.
129. Josh Gerstein, Time Warner Case Finds A Surprise, N.Y. SUN, Dec. 7, 2006,
http://www.nysun.com/national/time-wamer-case-finds-a-surprise/44761; Bailey Cavaleeri
LLC, supra note 112, at 1-2; Feldberg & Saperstein, supra note 114; Kevin LaCroix, Class
Action Opt-Outs: The Impact of Competition on Securities Lawsuit Resolution, THE D & 0
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institutional investors that have opted out of class actions than for those who
continue as class members. 130 The opt-out behavior hinders the effectiveness
of the class action device, particularly for individual investors, and exploits
the securities legislation. As a result, the prospect of large and ever-
increasing opt-outs makes negotiating a class settlement more difficult, in-
creases the cost of litigation for both sides, occupies federal judicial re-
sources, and, over time, will erode the securities class action.
B. Discord Between the Goal and the Application-The Erosion
The securities legislation has created some high hurdles that plaintiffs
must clear. Some critics refer to PSLRA as the "Corporate License to Lie
Act,"' 1 while others have commented that it may be an obstacle to investors
who attempt to recover billions of lost investments due to fraud."' Several
cases and judicial orders demonstrate the problems with applying the securi-
ties legislation to securities class actions and the existence of the opt-out
problems. Two cases in particular highlight the discord between legislative
intent and application, Enron'33 and AOL Time Warner,134 where the courts
had to address the issues of settlement, objectors, and opt-outs.
1. Lessons from Enron
Enron Corporation was an energy company based in Houston, Texas.135
Enron employed nearly 22,000 people across the United States and last re-
ported revenues of $101 billion. 136 In 2001, Enron investors and the business
world discovered that Enron's financial success was a result of an institu-
tionalized and systematic procedure of accounting fraud. 137 The fraud gave
rise to one of the biggest corporate scandals of the twenty-first century. 138 At
the height of the company's success, Enron stock was worth ninety dollars
DIARY (April 20, 2008), http://www.dandodiary.com/2008/04/articles/optouts/class-action-
optouts-the-impact-of-competition-on-securities-lawsuit-resolution; Fractured Class Actions,
supra note 128.
130. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
131. Pritchard, supra note 23, at 126.
132. Id.
133. Newby v. Enron Corp., 188 F. Supp. 2d 684 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
134. In re AOL Time Warner S'holder Derivative Litig., No. 02 Civ. 6302 (CM), 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124372 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2010).
135. In re Enron Corp., 17 FCC Rcd. 624, 625 (2002).
136. Id
137. Newby, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 691-92.
138. In re Enron Corp. Sec. Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 613 (S.D.
Tex. 2002).
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per share.139 By the time the scandal was fully disclosed the company's
stock was worth pennies. '40
Enron's practice was to create limited liability subsidiaries, in the Unit-
ed States and in several foreign countries, and to place debts and financial
losses on the books of these companies in order to avoid reporting the losses
to investors and the SEC. '' Enron executives were also able to inflate com-
pany stock prices by using a projection-based system of accounting, mark-
to-market, which allows future anticipated profits to be counted on current
company financial books.'42 Enron executives had to increasingly distort
company finances to create the appearance of large profits.' 43 Some of the
most egregious behavior occurred during the last year of the company's
existence when founder and CEO, Kenneth Lay, encouraged the public and
investors to have faith in him and the company.'" Lay and other company
executives asked investors to buy and hold their Enron stock, while they
used their knowledge of company fraud and losses to sell their personal
stock for over $100 million in profit for themselves, their family members,
and their friends. 4 ' These scandalous practices left investors and employees
with an alleged forty-four billion dollars in losses. '46
In 2001, nearly sixty-seven billion dollars in debt, Enron filed bank-
ruptcy. 14 In litigation surrounding the Enron collapse, employees and inves-
tors in Enron stock filed lawsuits under both federal and state securities laws
against the company; individual officers and directors; the company's ac-
counting firm, Arthur Anderson; and the company's former law firm,
Vinson & Elkins. 14' Enron settled all of its lawsuits for a total of $7.2 bil-
lion. 149 Institutional investor and lead plaintiff, the University of California,
along with more than one million individuals received $7.2 billion for their
settlement of stock investment losses."o This settlement is short of the al-
leged $44 billion lost by investors and will be less per investor than the $688
139. ENRON: THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM (Magnolia Pictures 2005). See also In re
Enron Corp., 235 F. Supp. 2d at 613-19, 622-29 (describing the fraudulent scheme).
140. ENRON, supra note 139.
141. Newby, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 692-93.
142. See ENRON, supra note 139.
143. In re Enron Corp., 235 F. Supp. 2d at 613-19.
144. See ENRON, supra note 139.
145. Id.
146. Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec.), No. H-01-3624, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 84656, at *55 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 8, 2008).
147. Newby v. Enron Corp., 188 F. Supp. 2d 684, 692 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
148. Constance Parten, Top 10 Class-Action Lawsuits, LAWINFO.COM (Apr. 19, 2010),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/35988343/Top_10_ClassActionLawsuits?slide=9. See also New-
by v. Enron Corp., 302 F.3d 295, 298-300 (5th Cir. 2002).
149. Parten, supra note 148.
150. In re Enron Corp. Sec., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84656 at *55-56.
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million dollars in legal fees earned by the plaintiffs' law firm, Coughlin
Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins (which, if employing 688 lawyers equally
sharing in profit, would give each attorney one million dollars). 5'
With the goal of recovering as much lost profit as possible and with
several thousand litigants and various settlement classes, objections, and
opt-outs, the Enron litigation was particularly protracted and complicated,
lasting from 2001 until 2006, with settlement payments still being made as
late as 2010. 152 Nothing in the securities legislation could have prevented the
Enron scandal or the ensuing litigation-related challenges. For example, in
2004, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Newby v. Enron Corp.,53
one of the investor-plaintiff cases. In this case, the Fifth Circuit upheld a $40
million partial settlement against the objections of class members. 5 4 The
court determined that the $40 million amount was fair, adequate, and rea-
sonable.155 In coming to this decision, the court considered the plaintiffs'
small estimated potential recovery,' 56 the scope of discovery conducted by
the plaintiffs,' 57 and the fairness test applied by the district court. 158
In a decision handed down within three weeks of the Enron case, the
court in In re Global Crossing Securities & ERISA Litigation,'59 approved a
$325 million partial settlement over the objections of class members. 6 ° In
coming to this decision, the court made several observations about the effi-
ciencies of class action adjudication and settlement. The court observed that
"individual prosecution of securities claims would make little practical
sense, especially in light of the proposed settlement."'' 6' The court also ob-
served that "persons or entities wishing to pursue their own actions presum-
ably have excluded themselves from the settlement class," and the remain-
ing class members had "accepted the efficiencies of class-wide litigation."'
' 62
These decisions highlight the realistic options available to a plaintiff seeking
recovery under the securities legislation, which are to opt out of the litiga-
151. See Amanda Bronstad, Coughlin Stoia Bags 'Lion's Share of Enron Fees, THE
NAT'L L.J. (Sept. 9, 2008),
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202424377705&s 1return=1.
152. Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec.), No. H-01-3624, 4:01-cv-03624
(S.D. Tex. Nov. 19, 2010) (ordering the rejection of any class claims submitted after October
2010); GILARDI & Co., LLC., http://www.gilardi.com/enron/securities/# (last visited July 14,
2012) (stating the third distribution of settlement funds commenced December 31, 2010).
153. 394 F.3d 296 (5th Cir. 2004).
154. Id. at310-11.
155. Id. at301.
156. Id. at 302.
157. Id. at 305.
158. Id. at 300, 308.
159. 225 F.R.D. 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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tion and pursue individual claims or settle as part of the class. 163 The In re
Global Crossing court seemed comfortable with the idea that unhappy class
members will exercise their right to opt out and "pursue their own actions"
individually or in small groups."4 While observing the efficiency of the set-
tlement, the court mentioned the judicial and personal resources that must be
expended to pursue one's own class action. 65 The district court's decision
also highlights that in cases like Enron and In re Global Crossing, with
many plaintiffs, defendants, and consolidated class actions, "' it is more like-
ly that class plaintiffs accepted that the company owed more money than it
owned assets, that a substantial amount of time had passed since the fraudu-
lent behavior was discovered, and that the particular settlement was the most
money that could be expected in the quickest timeframe. 167
The Enron and Global Crossing scandals also highlight the significant
amount of time it can take a plaintiff to recover any damages from a securi-
ties law violator, as well as the devastating effects violations of the securi-
ties laws can have on individuals and the business world. The plaintiffs in In
re AOL Time Warner, Inc., Securities & "ERISA" Litigation,"' a similar
case of fraud and investor loss, also experienced protracted litigation that
resulted in settlement and possibly unhappy investor recovery.169
2. AOL Time Warner, Inc.-Another Lesson
In In re AOL Time Warner, Inc. Securities & "ERISA" Litigation,
170
investors sued the company for fraud under federal securities law.171 The
investors alleged that the company fraudulently accounted for financial
transactions between 1998 and 2002.172 The fraudulent accounting created
163. See generally Newby, 394 F.3d 296 (rejecting class members' objection to the pro-
posed partial settlement).
164. In re Global Crossing, 225 F.R.D. at 454.
165. Id. at 456.
166. Id. at 441. This case involved more than fifty consolidated securities and ERISA
class actions.
167. Id. at 441-42, 456-57 (noting that GCL filed for bankruptcy protection in 2002, the
class period was from February 1999 to December 2003, eighty-one defendants were in-
volved, the significant delay in potential recovery, and that "the proposed settlement would
maximize the recovery of insurance money for the class."). In December 2001, Enron filed
for bankruptcy protection. The Enron cases included a class period from October 1998 to
November 2001 and involved more than forty individual defendants and businesses. See
Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec.), No. H-01-3624 (consolidated complaint for
violation of the securities laws), supra note 1, at 2, 43.
168. 381 F. Supp. 2d 192 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
169. See generally id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at202-03.
172. Id. at 204.
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the appearance that the company was generating revenue and inflated the
company's value by nearly $1.7 billion, when in fact the company was
simply moving money. 173 The company spent $2.4 billion to settle the secu-
rities class action to "put these matters behind [the company], [and] avoid
the costs and distractions of protracted litigation.' ' 174 Avoiding the cost of
litigation was impossible, however, because there were some opt-outs. Janus
Capital Group, a thirteen percent owner, and more than 100 other institu-
tional investors all exercised their opt-out rights in an effort to recover more
money. 175 Opt-outs are considered a "powerful tactical weapon," and at least
one high-profile plaintiffs' attorney, William S. Lerach, encourages clients
to pursue high-dollar figures. 176 Lerach sees settlements as "[sitting] passive-
ly by and [taking] a couple cents on the dollar." 177 Alone, Lerach persuaded
ninety-three state pension funds to opt out of the AOL Time Warner class
action. 178
As in the Enron cases, there were more claims than money to go
around in the AOL Time Warner litigation. Thousands of class plaintiffs
filed claims for AOL Time Warner class action settlement funds.179 Accord-
ing to settlement documents, several billion shares of AOL Time Warner
stock were affected by the fraudulent conduct. 8° Even the largest AOL
Time Warner stockholder might not be happy with a limited per share set-
tlement amount. The principal reason that the lead plaintiff agreed to the
settlement was the "immediacy and certainty of the benefit" as compared to
the risk of less or no recovery if the case proceeded to trial. 8'
If proceeding to trial offers little to no recovery, then how are Lerach
and many other plaintiffs' attorneys able to convince so many to opt out and
pursue litigation separately? One answer is the desire for more settlement
dollars per plaintiff and the growing trend that opt-out plaintiffs are collect-
ing more, while class action plaintiffs are collecting less.'82 Another answer
is that the existence of the securities legislation has led to a decrease in class
action filings and, therefore, a decrease in the number of class plaintiffs,
which increases the amount of available settlement dollars.
173. Parten, supra note 148.





179. See In re AOL Time Warner S'holder Derivative Litig., No. 02 Civ. 6302 (CM),
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124372, at *3-5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2010).
180. Id. at *47-48.
181. Notice of Proposed $2.6 Billion Settlement of Securities Class Action, In re AOL
Time Warner, Inc. Sec. & "ERISA" Litig., 381 F. Supp. 2d 192 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), available at
http://www.aoltimewamersettlement.com/pdf/altw1not.pdf
182. See Fractured Class Actions, supra note 128.
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C. Erosion by the Numbers
Securities class action filings are declining, while dismissal rates and
settlement values are increasing. In 2009, there was a fourteen percent drop
in securities class action filings as compared to prior annual filings.'83 Be-
tween 1997 and 2008 an average of 197 class actions were filed as com-
pared to 169 class actions filed in 2009."s4 Each of the twenty-eight class
actions"' not filed in 2009 represents at least fifty plaintiffs-1400 total-
that did not pursue litigation. Securities class action filings continue to de-
crease as the procedural hurdles associated with such filings continue to be
refined and litigated.'86
For those plaintiffs that pursued a securities class action, the action was
likely settled or dismissed. Between 1996 and 2009, in a sample of 3052
federal securities class action filings, forty-one percent (41%) of class ac-
tions were dismissed and fifty-nine percent (59%) settled.'87 The securities
legislation continues to fuel the trend of dismissal and settlement.
In a recent 2011 case, a procedural hurdle created by the securities leg-
islation halted a class action. 88 In Durgin v. Mon,' 89 the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of a putative securi-
ties class action. "' The plaintiffs alleged losses over one million dollars"'
based on misstatements by the defendants. 192 The appellate court held that
the plaintiffs' "complaint fail[ed] to allege any direct evidence showing
[the] defendants acted with the requisite scienter."' 93 Consequently, the ac-
tion could not proceed for failure to meet the heightened pleading require-
ment under PSLRA. 1
94
The most successful class action plaintiffs overcome a motion to dis-
miss and reach settlement, Between 1996 and 2009, sixty percent (60%) of
the securities class actions that settled were settled "after the first ruling on
183. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 31, at 2.
184. Id.
185. This figure was reached by subtracting the number of federal securities fraud class
actions filed in 2009 (164) from the annual average of filings between 1997 and 2008 (197)
and by applying SLUSA provision 15 U.S.C. §§ 78bb(f)(1)-(2), which defines the term
"covered class action" to include one where "damages are sought on behalf of more than 50
persons." See supra Part II, B.
186. See, e.g., CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 31, at 22.
187. Id. at 1, 21.
188. Durgin v. Mon, 415 Fed. App'x 161,163, 167 (1lth Cir. 2011).
189. Id.
190. Id. at 167.
191. Durgin v. Tousa, Inc., No. 06-61844-CIV-MARRA, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76315,
at *3-4 (S.D. Fla. July 15, 2008).
192. Durgin v. Mon, 659 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1252-53 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
193. Durgin, 415 Fed. App'x at 165. See also discussion supra Part II.B.2.
194. Durgin, 415 Fed. App'x at 163, 165-67. See also discussion supra Part II.B.2.
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the motion to dismiss but before a ruling on summary judgment."' 95 For
those plaintiffs that successfully obtained securities class action certification
and overcame hurdles erected by the securities legislation, the median time
to settlement was thirty-six months, whereas the median time to dismissal
was twenty-three months. '96 As the length of time between filing and resolu-
tion increases, so does the likelihood of settlement. 97
Courts and participants may view securities actions with extensive lag
time as having strong causes of action that are likely to recover damages. 9'
The individual plaintiff-participant in a securities class action may benefit
the most from this lag time between filing and resolution because he or she
is more likely to recover a larger dollar amount.' 99 The increased presence of
institutional investors, favored by the securities legislation, may explain
increased settlement values. In 2009, institutions served as lead plaintiffs in
nearly sixty-five percent (65%) of settlements, and these actions were asso-
ciated with significantly higher settlements. 2"0 Though there has been an
increase in settlement values, the increase in the number of settlements is
negligible.20 ' In a sample of class action settlements, a majority of cases,
almost fifty-eight percent (57.6%), were settled during the pre-reform 1991-
1996 period as compared to only twenty-six percent (26%) in the post-
reform 1996-2000 period, demonstrating declining settlement rates since the
securities legislation was enacted.20 2 The loss of institutional investors
through the exercise of opt-out rights, particularly ones that serve as lead
plaintiff, could have a pervasive effect on settlement dollar values as well as
the number of securities class action settlements that occur.
195. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 31, at 21.
196. Id.
197. See id. at 22.
198. Id. (stating that time to dismissal is shorter than time to settlement.). See generally
e.g., Newby v. Enron Corp., 394 F.3d 296 (2004); In re Global Crossing Sec. & ERISA Litig.,
225 F.R.D. 436, 455-56 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (lag time between filing and settlement was six
years and two years, respectively).
199. RYAN & SIMMONS, supra note 3, at 1-3. Research demonstrates that there was an
increase in settlement values in 2009 and that settlement amounts with higher than historical
averages occurred from 1996 to 2008. Also, figure 3 shows an increase in settlement amounts
from 1996 to 2009. These increased settlement amounts cover the same period of time and
the increase in lag time.
200. Id. at 10.
201. Id. at 1.
202. Bajaj, Mazumdar & Sain, supra note 71, at 1010.
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IV. SOLUTIONS
A. Potential Existing Solutions
Some possible solutions to the opt-out problem have been proposed in
other contexts and are applicable here. One possible solution is a "blow pro-
vision., 213 Such a provision would give defendants the ability to terminate a
class settlement if a minimum number of class members opt out.2°4 These
provisions are part of current settlements involving defendants with direc-
tors' and officers' (D & 0) liability insurance." 5 These provisions seem to
be effective, but, when applied, they may not address the problem of in-
creased litigation or opt outs since an unsuccessful settlement would inevi-
tably result in at least some continued litigation.2 6
A possible solution, not yet instituted, "is to require shareholders to de-
clare their opt-out status before the class settlement is negotiated.""2 7 This
would allow defendants to make informed decisions about the reasonable-
ness and effectiveness of a possible settlement.2 8 This option would allevi-
ate much of the surprise defendants associated with opt-outs face, would
encourage more settlement negotiations, and may decrease some plaintiffs'
practice of participating in a class to gain resources and information only to
be used in a separate direct action later. The concern with this approach,
however, is that a mandatory early opt-out provision may conflict with the
opt-out rights granted by FRCP 23.209
Another possible solution, not yet instituted, is to require plaintiffs to
make a showing of good cause before opting out.20 This solution would
"limit a [plaintiffs] ability to opt out of a class suit to those instances in
which [the plaintiff] could demonstrate that the class will not adequately
represent [the plaintiffs] interests."2 To meet this "heightened standard for
exclusion," the opt-out plaintiff would need to show that his claims allege
some unique substantive legal issue or material fact.212 While this may seem
203. Bailey Cavaleeri LLC, supra note 112.
204. Id.
205. Id.; Richard Bortnick, Class Action Opt-Outs: The New Frontier, THE D & 0 DIARY
(Feb. 21, 2007), http://dandodiary.blogspot.com/2007/02/class-action-opt-outs-new-
frontier.html.
206. Bailey Cavaleeri LLC, supra note 112; Bortnick, supra note 205.
207. Bailey Cavaleeri LLC, supra note 112.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 17, at 1540.
211. Mark W. Friedman, Note, Constrained Individualism in Group Litigation: Requiring
Class Members to Make a Good Cause Showing Before Opting Out of a Federal Class Ac-
tion, 100 YALE L.J. 745, 756-57 (1990).
212. Id. at 757.
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harsh, this proposed solution would ensure that substantive securities law
issues are uniformly resolved. Additionally, this solution would address the
goals of the securities legislation by consolidating and litigating cases with
common issues of fact and law, reducing vexatious litigation, and efficiently
using judicial resources, while ensuring that plaintiffs retain their opt-out
right.
B. A Proposed Solution That Combines Several Approaches
The best solution would be to combine the heightened good cause
standard for exclusion for opting out with Rule 1 1 sanctions that currently
exist to deter baseless lawsuits,"1 3 thereby ensuring that plaintiffs who opt
out do so in good faith and for a valid reason. Rule 1 1 sanctions are manda-
tory under PSLRA and are applied to plaintiffs or defendants if the court
finds that a party or attorney violated Rule 1 l(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 1 4 Rule 11 attempts to limit frivolous lawsuits, ensuring
accuracy and integrity in federal pleadings, by requiring attorneys to certify
that a reasonably adequate basis in fact exists to support the claims made in
the pleadings.215 Rule 11 sanctions require the violating party to pay the
opposing side a penalty, usually in the form of fees to the opposing plaintiffs
and opposing counsel. 16
An attorney and a party who opts out of a class action should be subject
to a mandatory review for Rule 11 sanctions to ensure that the initial partici-
pation in the class action was done with integrity and upon an adequate basis
to believe that the case had merit at the time the party joined the original
litigation. Applying the current mandatory review in this way, coupled with
creating a heightened exclusion requirement for opting out, would work to
ensure that when a class action is initiated (1) there is a realistic opportunity
for class members to recover damages, (2) class members are committed to
a resolution to their claims, and (3) the claims are not so weak that they will
result in an undesirable settlement amount. The combined suggestion will
also deter institutional investors from exercising opt-out rights as a way to
leverage a better individual settlement, which thereby jeopardizes class set-
tlement.
Combining these two proposed solutions would also work to ensure
that during the litigation and settlement phases of a class action, the poten-
tial resolution of claims are less likely to be jeopardized by the hunt for the
213. See Avery, supra note 12, at 358-60.
214. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(c), 78u-4(c) (2006).
215. See Cotton, supra note 16, at 751-52. See also Simon DeBartolo Group, L.P. v.
Richard E. Jacobs Group, Inc., 186 F.3d 157, 166-67 (2d Cir. 1999).
216. See Gurary v. Nu-Tech Bio-Med, Inc., 303 F.3d 212, 220 (2d Cir. 2002); Simon
DeBartolo Group, L.P., 186 F.3d at 166.
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largest recovery. These provisions would require a class member and plain-
tiffs' attorneys to be reasonably positive about their participation in the class
action before joining. Furthermore, these provisions would ensure that once
a class member decides to join an action, he will remain a part of that action
and be bound by the resulting substantive law and settlement provisions,
unless a good cause-not based solely on monetary recovery--dictates that
an opt-out should occur. Such a combined approach would make settlement
more realistic for the individual class member, reduce the institutional inves-
tor's influential effect on the class action, and reenergize the class action
device with the power and leverage it was designed to wield.
V. CONCLUSION
Securities fraud never results in a good solution; it only creates victims
and violators. The victims want to use any means available to them to re-
cover the money and faith they have lost, and violators want to use any
means available to them to keep the money and faith they have gained. The
securities fraud class action is a useful means of pursuing claims that would
be difficult to litigate individually and a useful means of strengthening the
enforcement of securities laws. To assist victims and violators, Congress has
enacted, and the judiciary has interpreted, several statutes. Individually, the-
se statutes were drafted with good intentions and were designed to fix the
perceived problems in the class action system. The single statutory scheme
of securities regulation, however, creates an unintended conflict when sepa-
rate statutes are enacted at separate times to accomplish one purpose. These
conflicts have resulted in multiple hurdles in securities litigation and in-
creased limitations on the rights of small individual investors. Other conse-
quences include increased attempts to circumvent curative legislation, in-
creased attempts to pursue litigation with less restriction, increased opt-outs
and litigation from institutional investors, increases in litigation timeframes
and judicial review of settlements, and increased settlement recovery for few
plaintiffs with corresponding decreased settlement recovery for the majority
of plaintiffs. A resolution that combines sanctions with a heightened stand-
ard for exclusion would go a long way toward addressing the inherent con-
flicts in the securities legislation.
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